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Abstract—Infrastructure is the back bone of economic 
development of any Nation. Road infrastructure plays key 
role for trade and commerce, connecting the production 
and consumption centers. Road and transportation 
infrastructure construction is highly capital intensive, 
wherein the government alone cannot meet its ends and 
initiated Public Private Partnership (PPP) for its execution 
right from planning and designing to its maintenance 
through various PPP models.  Over the last few years many 
of the awarded roadprojects through PPP modelare stalled 
citing various reasons. This technical paper analyses the 
risk factors associated with PPP –toll operated road 
projects through case studies and suggested corrective 
measures like shadow tolling and hybrid models for 
restoration of PPP. 
Keywords— PPP in Highway Projects, Risk factors, 
Shadow Tolling, Hybrid Models. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
India’s growth-story in recent years is a most phenomenal 
development in the world economy. Historically Indian 
economy has been a consumption driven and showing 
tremendous growth over the last two decades demanding 
large investments in infrastructure. In order to sustain 
growth in future, Government alone cannot fund such large 
investments in infrastructure projects and participation from 
private agencies is imperative. Initiatives from the 
government have led to increasing private sector 
participation in India’s infrastructure development.  
Roads especially expressways, highways & rural roads are 
the most critical part of infrastructure that aims directly 
improving connectivity from consumption centers to 
production centers across the country bridging the industry 
and agriculture for the improvement of trade and quality life 
of its citizens. The National Highways Authority of India 
(NHAI) - the nodal agency for ensuring rapid development 
of roads in the country has made PPP the preferred 
modefrom National Highway Development Programme 
(NHHDP) phase-III for most of its projects. Road Projects 
execution under PPPmodel,take much lesser time to 
complete and the Government does not have to bear cost 
over-runs where it plays a regulatory role. 
Over the last half decade many of the road infrastructure 
projects have been stalled, abandoned or terminated either 
by the sanctioning authority or by the concessionaire due to 
various reasons. The reasons could be clearances on land 
and forest, non availability of aggregate due to ban on 
mining, or the financial risk or the cost overruns. Stalling of 
these projects has huge negative repercussion on the 
employment and growth. In this paper a critical examination 
of PPP models and the reasons for the failure of the projects 
initiation, is carried to suggest measures for its restoration. 
Public Private Participation in Highway Sector:A Public 
Private Participation (PPP) is a consideration between 
government & private sector entity for public asset creation 
or public service delivery for specified period of time and 
performance measurable by public entity or its 
representative. As infra-projects are highly capital intensive, 
the PPPsarrangement helpsgovernments to meetits demands 
for the development of modern and efficient facilities, 
infrastructure and services while providing value for 
taxpayers[1]. 
 
II. OBJECTIVES OF PPP 
 Harness Private Sector efficiencies 
 Focus of Life Cycle approach for development 
of any project 
 Innovation and Technological improvements 
 Provision of affordable and improved services  
Essential Conditions of PPP 
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 Investments made by private sector entity 
 Risk sharing with the private sector 
 Performance linked fee payment structure 
&/or through user charges 
 Conformance to performance standards  
 
Table Different PPP Models 
Design-Build 
(DB) 
Design Build-Operate 
(DBO) 
Operation & 
Maintenance 
Contract (O & M) 
Design-Build-
Finance-
Maintain 
(DBFM) 
Design-Build-
Finance-Operate-
Transfer(DBFOT) 
Build-Own-
Operate (BOO) 
Build 
Operate Transfer (BOT) 
Build-Own-Operate-
Transfer (BOOT) 
Buy Build 
Operate (BBO) 
Build-Own-Lease-
Transfer (BOLT) 
 
Merits of PPP Models 
 Easing Budgetary Constraints 
 Value for money issue 
 A realistic control of cost 
 A streamlined construction schedule and reliable 
project implementation enable enhanced economic 
development 
 Assets creation, maintenance and service delivery 
 Set on sustainable and environmentally - Compatible 
development 
 Social benefits 
 Transparency 
 Transfer of technology 
 Project stability 
 Focusing the Role of Public Authority on its 
Regulatory function 
Demerits: 
 Both the public entity and the private firm is seeking 
to gain from the relationship-user ends up paying 
more 
 Involves high risk level 
 Long term contracts not reliable 
Most of the Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects in 
Highways sector have been implemented on the Design-
Build-Finance-Operate-Transfer (commonly referred to as 
DBFOT or the BOT model).The matrix below Table-1 
explains the fundamentals of this model with respect to the 
traditional Engineering Procurement Construction (EPC) 
mode of awarding infrastructure development works: 
 
Table: 1 Responsibility Matrix for EPC Vs DBFOT 
Responsibility 
Matrix 
Who 
designs 
Who 
finances 
Who 
constructs 
Who 
operates 
and 
maintains 
Who owns 
land and 
assets 
 
Will the 
asset be 
transferred 
back? 
Normal EPC Government Government Private Government Government NA 
DBFOT Private 
Private Gets 
toll 
collection 
Rights 
Private 
Private 
(Till the 
Concession 
Period) 
Private 
Government End 
of 
Concession 
 
One of the advantages of BOT model is that it takes the 
infrastructure financing load off from the Government 
balance sheet.When the projects are notviable for private 
participation,  Government funding and liability in the form 
of Viability Gap Funding(VGF) is contributed and is 
restricted to a max of 40% of the project cost or the Annuity 
payments depending on whether the Project is implemented 
as BOT Toll or as BOT Annuity[2].  
Projects Awarded under PPP Model but could not be 
initiated: As per the estimates of Working Group on 
Central Road sector that the targets set for the year2017 
would be 85,000 km.  It could be possible only through PPP 
model. PPP in highways started with the NHDP Phase-III. 
While the projects under NHDP Phase-I and Phase-II were 
predominantly implemented under the engineering 
procurement and construction (EPC) mode. Between2005-
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12, about 40,000 km of road was awarded to different 
concessionaires, out of which about 25,000 Km of road 
network is yet to commence its execution due to various 
reasons. Besides NHDP programme, 15 states awarded 
about 173 State Highway projects amounting to 80,000 cr 
(in which UP’s Yamuna Expressway worth 30,000 is an 
important project) are in the process of execution are, too 
facing some hurdles[3].  
Risk Factor in PPP:Risk is a threat or probability that an 
action or event will adversely or beneficially affect an 
organization’s ability to achieve its objectives. Also risk is 
‘Uncertainty of Outcome’, either from pursuing a future 
positive opportunity, or an existing negative threat in trying 
to achieve a current objective. 
 
Various Risks in Road Infrastructure PPP projects: 
A. Pre-operative task risks 
 Delays in land acquisition:landis unavailable to 
be used within required time due to native’s claims 
on the land. 
 External linkages: adequate and timely 
connectivity to the project site is not available, 
which impact the commencement of construction 
and overall pace of project. 
 Financing risks:sufficient finance is not available 
at reasonable cost due to changes in market 
conditions or credit availability, resulting in delays 
in the financial closure. 
 Planning risks: Risks that the pre-development 
studies (technical, legal, financial and others) 
conducted were inadequate and not robust enough. 
 
B. Construction phase risks 
 Design risk: risk that the proposed design will be 
unable to meet the performance and service 
requirements resulting in additional costs for 
modification and redesign. 
 Construction risk: risk that the construction will 
not be completed on time, on budget or to 
specification leading to additional raw materials 
and labour costs, additional financing costs, 
increase in the cost of maintaining existing 
infrastructure. 
 Approvals risk: Risk of delays in approvals 
causing delay in construction as per the 
construction schedule. Such delays in obtaining 
approvals may lead to cost overruns. 
 
C. Operation phase risks 
 Operations and maintenance risk: Risks 
associated with need for increased maintenance of 
assets over project life-cycle to meet performance 
requirements. 
 Traffic risk: Risk that demand for a service varies 
from initial forecasted expectations, causing short-
fall in the total revenue. 
 Payment risk: Risk that fees for services are not 
collected in full or are not set at a level that allows 
recovery of costs. 
 Financial risk: Risk that the concessionaire 
introduces too much financial stress on the project 
by using inappropriate financial structure leading 
to additional funding costs for increased margins 
or unexpected refinancing costs. 
D. Other risks 
 Change in law: Refers to risk that the current legal 
/ regulatory regime will change, having an adverse 
impact on the project. 
 Force Majeure: These events are also called "Acts 
of God", to indicate that they are beyond the 
control of either contracted party. 
 Concessionaire risk: Risk that the concessionaire 
will prove to be inappropriate or unsuitable for 
delivery of the project, for example due to failure 
of their company. 
 Sponsor risk: Risk that the Sponsor will be an 
unsuitable partner for the project, for example due 
to poor project management or  unable to fully 
recognise the agreed terms of the Concession 
Agreement[4]. 
 Concessionaire/Government event of default: 
Risk that the concessionaire/government will not 
fulfil its contractual obligations and that the other 
party will be unable to – either enforce those 
obligations against the concessionaire, or unable to 
recover some form of compensation or remedy 
from the other party for any loss sustained by it as 
a result of the breach[5][6]. 
Success and failures encountered while executing the 
project activities at some of the PPPprojects and the 
learning drawn are tabulated in Table:2 below. 
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Table.2: Learning’s from Success and Failures at Some PPP Infra Projects 
Stage of 
Projects 
Project 
Activities 
Examples of successful 
PPPs 
Examples of PPPs where 
problems were 
encountered 
Learnings 
Project 
Preparation 
Comprehensive due 
diligence Studies & 
Robust Traffic / 
Market Projections 
Timarpur Integrated solid 
waste management project: 
Detailed technical studies, 
financial & risk evaluation, 
obtaining   regulatory & 
statutory approvals were 
done well in advance. 
Vadodara Halol Toll Road 
project:Incorrect 
estimation of projected 
traffic resulting in 
increased revenue Risk. 
Prior due diligence 
studies of technical & 
legal implications. 
Realistic Traffic 
estimates. 
Procurement 
 
Dealing with 
Speculative Bids 
 
 Hyderabad Metro 
project:Commercial 
utilization of land along 
with metro project led to 
wide divergent bids. 
Greater incentive to 
complete real estate 
development at the cost of 
metro. 
Speculative bids 
should be avoided & 
terminated; Fresh 
bidding should be 
called for. 
 
Importance of Lead 
Consortium 
Member/ Promoter 
of Concessionaire 
 Hyderabad Metro project: 
Maytas Metro was badly 
affected due to issues 
faced by its promoter–
Satyam Computer 
Services. Project failed to 
achieve financial closure.  
Adequate due diligence 
of Experience & 
expertise of Lead 
consortium member or 
promoter.   
Development 
 
Handling of Land 
Acquisition 
Hyderabad Metro project: 
Government handover 90% 
of the land within 120 days 
from signing of the 
agreement. 
Delhi Gurgaon expressway 
project: difficulty in 
acquiring the land 
impacted the overall 
project schedule. 
Completing land 
acquisition prior to 
Project Procurement.  
 
Streamlining of 
Approvals & 
Clearances 
Alandur Sewerage Project: 
Key approvals, including 
road cutting, shifting of 
services & environmental 
clearances were taken in 
advance. 
 A single interface for 
coordination of all 
approvals to prevent 
delays.  
 
Environmentally 
&Socially 
responsive 
development 
framework: 
Learning: 
Vadodara Halol Toll Road 
project: Intense public 
consultations were carried 
out. Bypasseswere 
introduced at various critical 
locations. 
 PPPs have an 
environmentally and 
socially responsive 
development 
framework.  
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Financing 
Innovations 
 
The Vadodara Halol Toll 
Road:Deep discount bonds 
with an option of take-out 
financing; Long term loans 
as a part of its financing 
structure. 
 PPP projects to be 
financially 
independent; 
Minimize reliance on 
government grants or 
schemes.  
Operations 
Favourable 
Operating 
Environment 
Amritsar Inter-state Bus 
Terminal project:Reduction 
in concessionaire’s revenue 
risk. 
 Create favourable 
operating 
environment for 
private sector to 
function optimally. 
 
Case Studies of PPP Projects wherein theconcessionaire 
is withdrawn:Among the awarded PPP highway 
projects,noteworthy mega projects where the concessionaire 
had withdrawn citing the problems of land acquisition and 
other reasons,areof GMR and GVK are of worth Rs. 10,700 
crore. Similar projects of small size are many, wherein 
many projects are taken over by the concessionaire on 
premium. As many as 1646 cases related to NHAI projects 
are under litigation at different levels. As of March 31st 
2011,funds amounting to the tune of Rs. 11206 cr are under 
dispute across various contracts involving NHAI. For better 
illustration case studies of three classical projects first one a 
port connectivity project, the second project passing 
through reserved forest and the otherone connectingtwo 
temple and heritage townsare discussed in the following 
paragraphs: 
Case Studies projects awarded but could not be 
initiated: 
Case Study-1: Chandhikole – Paradip NH 5A Proposal 
for 4 Lane to 6 Lane Conversion 
The 4-laneproject road currently operated on BoT has been  
called for bidding for its up gradation to 6L two times on  
DBFOT basis  and both the times could not get sufficient 
bidders for awarding the workon premium. The project road 
is the main linkage for bulk solid/liquid truck traffic 
movements from Paradip port to different parts of Orissa. 
At Chandhikole, NH-200 and NH 5 forming a junction with 
NH 5A which further leads to Paradip port. Project road and 
competingAlternate Routes (AR) are shown in the fig-1. 
 
Fig.1: Chandhikole – Paradip NH 5A Road Map with Regional Linkages 
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Salient Features of the Project: 
 Project Length: 76.618 Km (from 0.000 Km to 
76.618 Km proposed chainages) – starts from 
Chandhikole and ends at Paradip of NH 5A. 
 Project Cost: 1014.36 Crores. 
 Project Description: Six laning from 0.000 Km to 
76.618 Km. 
 Toll Plaza: 1 No’s (at 4.000 Km design chainage). 
 Bypasses: Nil. 
 Major Structures costing more than 50 Crores: 1 
No’s (96.82 Crores Mahanadi Bridge at 66.175 Km). 
Reasons for failure:The project is recommended for 
DBFOT (Toll) with only premium for a concession period 
of 30 years.  Current traffic is about 12500 PCU/day( 
Authors personal investigation ) and  largely contributed by 
local trucks.As per the concessioners estimate and the 
project shall be qualified for 6-lane augmentation (above 
40,000 PCU /day) in the year 2040. Observed Toll 
Collection at the Toll Plaza at the time of bidding was 7.12 
lacs per day.Estimated Toll Revenues by Commercial Date 
of Operation (COD)would be 13.51 lacs/day. Main reasons 
for failure of the project is at the time of  preparation of 
DPR due consideration is not given to  new port 
connectivity railway line,, effect of other upcoming private 
BOT ports and decline in port export and import activity 
due to ban on mining. As per actual the project is not viable 
for 6L even on 40% VGF for a concession period of 30 
years.   
Case Study-2: Angul - Sambalpur (NH 42) Proposal for 
conversion to 4-lane on DBFOT Pattern:FourLaning of 
Angul-Sambalpur Section of NH-42 starts at Km  112.000 
of Angul  To Km 265.000 at Sambalpur in the State Of 
Orissa (Fig-2). Major Goods traffic on the project road 
would mineral ore coal and iron finished products. The 
project is called for bidding on   maximum 40% Viability 
Grant Fund(VGF) for a concession period of 30 years. The 
project is awarded to concessionaire at a VGF of about 28% 
in August 2011, but could not take off for execution. 
Salient Features of the Project: 
 Project Length: 153.00 Km (from 112.00 Km to 
265.00 Km chainages) – starts from Angul and ends 
at Sambalpur of NH 42. 
 Project Cost: 1220.32 Crores. 
 Project Description: Rehabilitation and up-gradation 
to four laning standards. 
 Toll Plaza: 2 No’s (at 188 Km and 244.5 Km 
existing chainages). 
 Bypasses: 1 No’s (Sambalpur bypass – 3.9 Km). 
 Elephant Under passes : 5No. 
 Major Structures costing more than 50 Crores: Nil. 
 
Fig.2: Project Corridor Angul- Sambalpur NH-42 
(Source: Google map) 
Reasons for Non Commencement of Execution:  
 80% of the project road is in forest land and still 
awaiting for the clearances from MoEF and other 
local bodies. 
 Fall in traffic due to ban on mining activity and 
could not achieve financial closure, as bankers are 
not ready to finance. 
 Project cost escalations Total Project Cost given in 
DPR is 1220.32 Cr where as concessionaires 
estimate at the  time of  bidding 888 cr. 
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 The project stretch is a Naxalite prone area affecting 
the base camp and construction operations.   
Case Study-3: Madurai- Ramanathapuram Section of 
NH-49 Prposal for Partial 4-laning and balance with 2-
Lane with Paved Shoulders DBFOT (Toll):The Project 
stretch starts from Km 5+000  at Mthuraiand ends at 
Ramanathapuram beyond Km 120+1100(Fig-
3),cconnecting two temple towns Madurai Meenakshi and 
Rameswaram.Salient features are:  
 Project Length: 115.110 Km (from 5.000 Km to 
120.110 Km proposed chainages) – starts from 
Madurai and ends at Ramanathapuram of NH 49. 
 Project Cost: 683 Crores. 
 Project Description: Four laning from 5.000 Km to 
79.900 Km and Two laning from 79.900 Km to 
120.110 Km. 
 Toll Plaza: 2 No’s (at 28.00 Km and 90.00 Km 
existing chainages). 
 Bypasses: 5 No’s (Silaiman bypass – 3.245 Km, 
Thirupuvanam bypass – 9.075 Km, Thirupacetty 
bypass – 2.00 Km, Paramakudi bypass – 9.480 Km 
and Ramanathapuram bypass – 11.810 Km). 
 Major Structures costing more than 50 Crores: Nil. 
 
Fig.3: Project Corridor Mathurai- Rameswaram NH-49 
(Source: Google map) 
 
Reasons for Bid Failure:  
 Project road connects two famous Pilgrimage tourist 
places in India namely Madurai and Rameshwaram. 
But as the project road is approaching to a dead end 
after Ramanathapuram , chances for potential  
growth is limited. 
 Current traffic volumes on two stretches of project 
road  are 11000 PCU/day and 7000 PCU/day. Most 
of the DFOT rural roads enjoy Toll revenue  due to 
the  presence of  2-Axle and 3-axle traffic but on the 
project their contribution is very poor. Also the few 
trucks operating  on the corridor carrying building 
materials are local and their Toll contribution is very 
low. 
 As the project corridor is near to the sea coast  
significant portion of the land is under wastelands  
and future industrial growth is bleak. 
 Only few % of vehicles carrying through traffic 
carrying  withsalt, Tiles, Paddy, Fish /coir / Cement 
are the major commodities.  
 Since the project corridor is having an alternative 
(NH-85/NH-226) road, once the project road is 
ready, traffic on the project road   may be affected 
marginally to avoid the toll charges.  
 Due to the above reasons the estimated toll revenue 
by Commercial Date of Operation (COD) would be 
Rs. 9.53 lac/day does not qualify for bidding even on 
VGF. 
 
Risk Mitigating Measures:  
Shadow Tolls: Shadow tolls were implemented in the UK 
during 1990s. It is a payment structure where the road user 
does not pay any toll; instead the concessionaire collects 
revenue from the government in proportion to the number 
of vehicles using the road. While private operators have 
only the pricing tools to collect revenue, government 
additionally has the taxation tool as well which it can use to 
charge a higher road tax to its citizens. One way of doing 
this is imposing a cess on fuel. 
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The shadow tolling system effectively, makes the road 
services free for the user. At the same time, the government 
need not bear the extra burden of paying the toll, because it 
collects the money through the cess on petrol or diesel. The 
proposed cess would be minimal (less than a rupee) as it 
will be spread over a huge base and hence the citizens 
would not feel the pinch of the increase. The highway road 
traffic would not be hampered by high toll prices, and thus 
be closer to their capacity utilization, ensuring maximum 
economic and social benefit. 
Conclusions &Remarks:In the present BOT scenario and 
also the prevailing social political environment is not 
conducive for running toll operations business is a tough 
situation to the concessionaire due to public resistance and 
political interventions for popular gains. Under this hostile 
environment, execution of stalled projects and 
commencement of new PPP projects under BOT model is 
uncertain. Regulatory Authorities (NHAI/State 
Governments) need to rethink and invent new strategies in 
PPP model for restoration of Infrastructure. Mechanism  
like shadow tolling have their respective pros and cons that 
need to be debated considering various policy constraints 
such as budget availability, willingness to pay tolls, value 
for money, transfer of risks to the private party, ease of 
implementation etc. Going forward, it is expected that 
Government would seriously explore such mechanisms on 
test case basis to address some of the main issues that exist 
on the Highways network. Other strategic options could be 
reducing the concession period and granting VGF, awarding 
projects at reduced concession period on VGF+ Annuity 
combination. Also Government should implement latest 
traffic management and monitoring technologies, where in 
the roads are Toll Freeand ,  traffic would be monitored and 
counted with state of technology and concessionaire would 
be appropriately compensated for the operated traffic. Such 
mechanisms would help Indian Government to achieve a 
Road User friendly environment and make driving on 
Indian highways a safer and a much better experience. 
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